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The Refugee Flows: An Apocalyptic Scenario
Despite being confronted with a severe economic and social 
crisis for the past six years, Greece has been faced with 
exponentially rising flows of asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants since 2013, and particularly during 2014-2015. None 
had predicted the dramatic escalation in asylum-seeking flows 
that took place during the first 10 months of 2015 and which are 
still in full swing. 
By 13 November 2015, 666,502 people had arrived in Greece, 
mostly crossing from Turkey to the Aegean islands, and 
most fleeing war and violence in their home countries (Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, but also Pakistan and Somalia). In October 
alone, more than 200,000 people crossed the Mediterranean to 
Greece, many of them specifically passing through the island of 
Lesvos. During the same period (Jan to mid-November 2015), 
Italy received 141,777 people. 
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Reception Capacity and Volunteer Help
The main brunt of dealing with the arrivals is 
born on the Greek islands, where reception 
capacity has increased during recent months 
but still remains insufficient. Thus, in Lesvos 
(where over half of the arrivals are registered), 
reception is organised at two main reception 
centres, Kara Tepe and Moria, which have a 
total capacity of 2,800 persons. As UNHCR 
notes,  there is an urgent need to increase this 
capacity (including improvement of sanitary 
and other facilities, winterisation of shelters, 
and the setup of a management unit for both 
centres to allocate people – as the current self-
managed system functions to the detriment 
of the more vulnerable people). The reception 
capacity in other islands, like Chios and Samos, 
is quite small (approx. 300) and also needs to be 
increased. In Athens, where most refugees arrive 
from the islands by boat, there are currently 
three reception centres operating: Elaionas, 
with a capacity for 700 people, Galatsi (Olympic 
facilities) with a capacity for 1,000, and Elliniko 
(Hockey), which can take 600. 
Figure 1: Arrivals and Deaths at the Mediterranean EU Borders 1 Jan – 3 Nov 2015
Table 1: Top five countries of origin by total 
arrivals in Greece, Italy, Spain and Malta
Source: IOM, Missing Migrants Project, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/ 
Source: IOM, Missing Migrants Project, 
 http://missingmigrants.iom.int/
The top countries of origin of migrants to 
Greece are in particular Syria, with over 50% 
of the arrivals, Afghanistan (approx. 30%) and 
Iraq (over 10%). These are populations that are 
clearly in need of international protection. 
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While the reception centres in Athens operate 
under the responsibility of the Alternate Ministry 
for Immigration Policy, coordination on the 
islands is divided between the Ministry for the 
Aegean, the local municipality and the Hellenic 
police, while the UNHCR co-chairs coordination 
in most of the sites. There are, however, concerns 
that all the organisations (small and large, local 
and foreign, international) operate on their own 
initiatives to contribute to creating a landscape 
of help, reception and solidarity and to respond 
to the basic critical needs of the arrivals, but 
without general coordination. There appears to 
be a reluctance on the part of the UNHCR to 
undertake coordination, while the Greek state 
authorities are seeking to improve capacity but 
without yet fully succeeding in this task. 
Although not only state and local authorities but 
also local volunteers, NGOs and international 
organisations have mobilized to face the 
emergency, the situation remains critical, and 
it is actually surprising that despite the harsh 
economic conditions, public opinion overall 
remains welcoming to the refugees. Mobilisation, 
solidarity, food and clothing donations, and 
voluntary work have been rising to impressive 
levels, not only on the islands but also in Athens 
and other municipalities. These efforts come not 
only from civil society, but also simple citizens 
who had not been civically active before but feel 
the urge to help.
The Balkan Route
This refugee influx – the largest refugee flow 
that Europe has experienced on its soil since 
the Yugoslav wars of the mid-1990s – has led 
to important changes at the European level, 
including a de facto or de jure interruption of 
Dublin III and the first safe country principle, 
and to intensive talks about Dublin III needing 
to be radically reformed. The irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers arriving in Greece during 
2015 have for the most part continued their 
journey via other south-eastern European 
countries (FYROM, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia 
– in different combinations) to central Europe 
(Hungary, Austria and eventually Germany, 
or even further north to Sweden), seeking 
refuge in countries where support and jobs are 
more available to them than in crisis-stricken 
Greece. Interestingly, countries like France, the 
Netherlands and Denmark have experienced 
very small increases in their asylum applications, 
refugee reception and irregular migrant flows.
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European Union Initiatives 
In response to the refugee crisis, the European 
Commission has taken several initiatives that 
immediately concern or involve Greece:
• Operation Sophia, decided in May 2015, 
aims at attacking smuggling networks 
through military means in the countries of 
last transit, notably Libya. However, it has 
effectively remained inactive for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that the actions 
should take place in the territory of the 
third country (Libya) on agreement with 
this country’s provisional government, and 
should be authorised by the UN Security 
Council (which is quite unlikely to concede 
authorisation). 
• Relocation quotas were decided in May 2015, 
and again in October 2015, for a total of 
160,000 people.
Source: European Asylum-Seeker Crisis: Scenarios, 4 November 2015, ACAPS (www.acaps.org ), p.4.
Source: UNHCR, 15 October 2015
Figure 3: The Balkan Route  
(initial path via Hungary)
Figure 2: The Balkan Route (path via Slovenia and Croatia)
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• On 15 October 2015, an EU-Turkey joint 
action plan was prepared with a view to 
improving cooperation with Turkey in 
managing the asylum-seeking flows that 
transit through the country towards Greece. 
The plan includes EU financial support for 
Turkey and Turkish cooperation to combat 
smuggling networks that operate on its 
shores.
• A 17-point plan was decided on at an EU 
summit on 25 October 2015 with a view to 
effectively managing the flows and avoiding 
countries in the Balkans and further north 
in the EU closing their borders, leaving tens 
of thousands of refugees stranded at various 
border crossings without shelter for the 
winter.
• Special emphasis has been put on increasing 
capacity to provide shelter to refugees along 
the Balkan route to ease the pressure on 
other European countries that are the end 
destinations. Greece has offered to create 
30,000 reception places by the end of the 
year and 20,000 more through rent subsidies 
and family hosting with the support of the 
UNHCR. 
• A further action plan enlisting the cooperation 
of African countries with a view to taming 
the flows was proposed at the Valetta Summit 
of 11-12 November. 
The challenge that Greece faces today is to 
manage the large refugee flows efficiently while 
respecting the human rights of the people 
arriving in the country, to provide appropriate 
registration of the arrivals, and to create the 
50,000 reception places for asylum seekers that 
were agreed on at the EU summit on 25 October 
2015.
Key Areas for Intervention and Policy 
Recommendations
Despite the huge flows of arrivals, asylum 
applications in Greece remain limited in number 
(see Table 2 below). The vast majority of Syrians, 
Afghans and Iraqis do not wish to apply for 
asylum in Greece as support measures, like 
accommodation, food and language training, 
are non-existent and jobs are certainly scarce. 
They thus move further north with the help of 
smugglers, voting with their feet, so to speak, 
and defying the Dublin III regulations. Indeed, 
the current numbers of asylum applications are 
in stark contrast with the size of the flows that 
are going through the country.
While the challenge that Greece is facing is huge, 
even to manage the flows, the higher risk is that 
of countries further north starting to close their 
borders, with the immediate danger that Greece 
remains hosting several tens of thousands of 
refugees, even temporarily. In other words, 
setting up well-functioning hotspots, increasing 
reception capacity and creating a longer-term 
reception scheme are three components of a 
single policy triptych that need to develop in full 
synergy.
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Table 2: Asylum Applications, 2013-2015 (totals 
and top 5 countries of origin)
Asylum applications 2013 2014 2015*
Country of origin
Afghanistan 804 1,708 1,586
Pakistan 610 1,617 1,474
Syria 253   786 2,965
Bangladesh   46   635   603
Albania 419   569   714
Total 4,816 9,432 10,718
First 10 months of 2015. Data available at http://asylo.gov.
gr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Greek-Asylum-Service-
statistical-data-October-2015_gr.pdf
The 17-point plan agreed by the EU leaders at 
their meeting on 25 October and released by the 
European Commission on the same day requires 
Greece:
• to increase its asylum-seeker reception 
capacity to 30,000 people; 
• to work with the UNHCR to provide rent 
subsidies and host family programmes for 
another 20,000;
• to cooperate better with FYROM, Albania 
and Turkey on border management and on 
fighting migrant smuggling networks;
• to improve registration in Greece.
These points have been put forward as 
requirements related to the relocation quotas 
that have just started operating in Greece 
(with the first transfers taking place in early 
November). The overall question is particularly 
sensitive as in a statement of 6 November 2015 
the President of the European Commission, Jean 
Claude Juncker, criticised Greece for rejecting 
joint coastguard patrols in the Aegean.
The situation presents special challenges as the 
installation of hotspot centres for the registration 
of arrivals on the island of Lesvos has resulted 
in a huge backlog in processing and departures. 
In mid-October, more than 16,000 people were 
stranded on the island due to the start-up of the 
hotspot operation. The challenges to registration 
include a lack of Eurodac machines for 
fingerprinting and insufficient staff. Obviously, 
the more people that are left on the island the 
greater the needs for reception, shelter, food 
and medical aid. It is expected that deteriorating 
weather conditions and rough seas may push the 
flows towards the Greek-Turkish land border, 
where part of a previously-constructed fence 
collapsed during floods last winter. 
It is of the utmost political and economic 
importance for Greece to turn this refugee crisis 
into an opportunity. In order to face the above 
challenges Greece needs to take the initiative on 
several fronts.
Increase the First Reception Capacity in 
Border Areas
• There is a need to increase and improve 
reception capacity, not only in Athens but 
particularly on the islands. The functioning 
of the hotspots and the comprehensive 
registration and screening of arrivals requires 
better and larger reception facilities. There is 
a need to further pursue the disbursement of 
the relevant EU funds accorded to Greece. In 
fact, so far only 42 million out of the promised 
259 million Euros have been received.
• There is also urgency to create reception 
centres at Idomeni (Greek FYROM border) 
and in Evros. At Idomeni, cooperation with 
FYROM has been very good and flows were 
managed efficiently, minimising problems 
7 ■  Turning the Refugee Crisis into an Opportunity?  
 Current Challenges for Greece and Suggestions for Action  
even though arrivals range from 5,000 to 
11,000 per day but a new emergency has 
been created as of November 21, when 
FYROM partially closed the border and 
allowed to pass only Syrians, Afghans and 
Iraquis. Thus a couple of thousands (and 
constantly increasing) Iranians, Moroccans, 
Palestinians and other nationalities remain 
stranded and current capacities certainly do 
not suffice to face the situation. 
• There is a need for Greek-Turkish 
cooperation between Edirne and Evros in 
creating reception capacity on both sides 
of the border, as it is very likely that rough 
weather will push the flows towards the land 
borders.
• There is a need for better use of the 
organisational and financial capacity of 
international organisations like the UNHCR 
in border areas, where they should take a 
more central role in the management of first 
reception. This is of absolute importance as 
currently there is a probable waste of effort 
because of non-coordination by different 
NGOs and volunteer groups.
• There is an urgent need to increase the 
number of Eurodac machines and the related 
staff for fingerprinting at the hotspots all 
over the country so as to avoid backlogs and 
temporary crises, particularly in small places 
like the islands, but also perhaps in the future 
in the green border areas.
Informing Asylum Seekers about Relocation
It has so far been seen positively that asylum 
seekers are not interested in staying in Greece 
but instead prefer to move on quickly, either 
on their own or by using smuggling networks. 
Indeed, this issue already arose last year when 
300 Syrians protested in Syndagma square, 
refusing to apply for asylum in Greece because 
support would be minimal and jobs inexistent. 
This protest anticipated what would later become 
a massive phenomenon: people enter Greece but 
within a matter of days or weeks (depending 
on their resources and networks) move on via 
FYROM and the Balkan route to other European 
countries, and predominantly Germany.
Greece is currently at risk of not attracting 
sufficient asylum seekers to activate the relocation 
quotas. It may not be clear in the media discourse, 
but the relocation quotas concern asylum 
seekers, not people who are simply entering the 
EU through Greece and then moving on. 
• Addressing asylum seeker mistrust is of 
paramount importance. Right now, Syrians 
and Afghans arriving on the Greek islands, 
and even further in Athens, are not informed 
of the possibility of relocation if they apply 
for asylum in Greece. Moreover, even when 
they are informed they are afraid that this 
may not eventually turn out to be the case. 
An additional negative point is that even if 
they are selected for relocation they cannot 
choose the country of destination. While 
the relocation system certainly has its weak 
points, there is a need to provide information 
through NGOs and volunteers in a language 
that the asylum seekers understand. This can 
be done by means of printed materials and 
oral interventions at the major reception 
centres on the islands and in Athens. 
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Preparing Refugee Reception and Integration 
• Greece needs to draw up a plan to distribute 
asylum seekers in municipalities across 
the country. There should be a call for 
municipalities to volunteer to host 5 to 30 
families each (depending on the size of each 
municipality – a rough calculation is that 
325 municipalities taking an average of 20 
families, with an average family size of 6, 
comes to a total of 39,000 people). This is a 
plan that can be managed at a local day-to-
day interpersonal level, particularly in small 
towns and villages. It is clear that children 
will be more easily integrated in small schools 
and neighbourhoods and adults can find jobs 
in local economies. These may initially be 
bottom-of-the-ladder jobs, but they would 
still be better than being unemployed or 
risking one’s life on the Balkan route. The 
story of Julien, a young asylum seeker who 
lived in Konitsa and succeeded in passing 
his university entrance exams in June 2015, 
can serve as a good example of how such 
local processes can be successful. In another 
example outside Greece, the Finnish Red 
Cross1 in agreement with the national 
government and in cooperation with the 
IOM, municipal authorities and other NGOs 
has set up a programme for the integration of 
refugees in Finland. 
• An Integration Partnership Model can be 
set up by the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of 
Labour and the Ministry of Education with 
participation by civil society stakeholders 
1 Fundamental Rights Agency (2015), Legal entry channels  
 to the EU for persons in need of international protection:  
 a toolbox, FRA FOCUS, 2/2015
that different municipalities could implement. 
Such a plan would mobilise and bring together 
local authorities, local NGOs, parishes and 
citizen groups in each small town to prepare 
to host the refugees. This would involve: 
• finding accommodation (often flats 
are closed if they are not rented – citizens 
could put their flats at the disposal of the 
municipality for a 5-year period in exchange 
for a nominal rent). 
• organising education courses taught by 
volunteers – in learning Greek for adults, 
in retraining for specific jobs (for men and 
women separately). These courses could build 
on existing courses for unemployed or other 
vulnerable persons. There is no need to re-
invent new courses.
• issuing work permits along with refugee 
or international protection status,  so that 
people can work legally. It is likely that the 
refugee flows can have a positive impact on 
the Greek economy if the human, financial 
and social capital that the refugees bring can 
be put to work. It should not be forgotten 
that the people who arrive in Greece and 
other European countries are often the 
more resourceful, and they are certainly 
determined. It is important to provide them 
with the legal means to recreate their lives in 
Greece and also to avoid boosting the action 
of criminal networks and exploitation (and 
illegitimate competition with the local labour 
force).
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• assigning a mentor to each family – e.g. 
a local woman or man who becomes the 
reference person for the mater/pater familia, 
a local child who becomes the guardian angel 
for a new child in school, a local teacher or 
social worker who helps the family in general.
• providing migrant families with a 
subsistence allowance – this could be 
financed by large NGOs such as Solidarity 
Now for the first year of the family’s stay in 
Greece with a view to catering for immediate 
day-to-day needs. Social grocery stores 
would also be important in providing food 
etc. These should be included in the larger 
solidarity initiatives that are being taken in 
Greece today to provide for the local poor, be 
they citizens or foreigners.
Border Management and Fighting Smuggling 
Networks
A greater challenge for Greece is probably border 
management. It is possible that in proposing 
joint patrolling the European Commission 
is trying to please Turkey in order to buy its 
cooperation in the overall management of 
the crisis, and particularly in effectively 
implementing the readmission agreement with 
the EU. Greece, by contrast, should put the 
emphasis on intelligence and cooperation in 
the fight against criminal networks involved 
in migrant smuggling, not only with Turkey 
but also with FYROM and Albania. This is the 
most effective way to prevent deaths at sea and 
it would not raise questions regarding Greece’s 
border management capacity. This is a sensitive 
issue as Greece has difficult relations with all 
three countries. 
Despite the friendly talks between Edi Rama, 
Prime Minister of Albania, and Alexis Tsipras 
during the UN meetings in NYC in October, 
there are tense relations between the two 
countries and, given the economic recession 
that is also plaguing Albania, Greece and the 
Greek minority in Albania represent convenient 
scapegoats to divert attention from internal 
Albanian problems.
The FYROM name issue remains unresolved, 
making relations between the two countries 
difficult, while in Turkey the new AKP 
government is likely to become more arrogant 
after its landslide electoral victory of 1st 
November. 
There is thus probably a need for high-level 
declarations of cooperation followed by 
diplomatic support and then ground-level 
operational support. There is a need for the 
European Commission to support Greece in 
this endeavour and also buy into this option and 
to be convinced that this is a more effective and 
appropriate way to act.
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Regarding border management, Greece 
should: 
• promote cooperation with Frontex rather 
than jointly patrolling with Turkey, and 
should argue at the political level that the EU 
borders are better guarded by joint Frontex 
forces rather than by a non-EU country. 
Recalling that there is an overall process 
towards Turkish accession to the EU, as the 
Prime Minister did recently, is also a good 
strategy. 
• propose that Frontex should be mobilised 
to improve Turkey’s capacity to manage 
its borders and prevent departures, in line 
with the EU-Turkey revised Joint Action 
Plan. The case of Spain and Morocco in the 
last decade could serve as a useful example: 
Morocco’s capacity was strengthened and 
EU support was developed via Frontex 
operations to increase the technical capacity 
of border patrols. The same should happen 
with Turkey. It should be made clear that 
Turkey, crucial though it may be in the 
region, is still a non-EU country.
• create hotspots on Turkish soil with the 
deployment of Frontex and EASO officers 
in line with improving the management of 
Greek-Turkish sea and land borders. This 
would improve the safe passage of asylum 
seekers and decrease pressure on Greece. 
It would also decrease the burden on the 
Balkan countries and the profits of smuggling 
networks.
Influencing Public Opinion across Europe
• There is a need for a media campaign in 
both conventional media (newspapers and 
television) and social media (facebook 
etc.) to showcase the level of solidarity and 
volunteer mobilisation in Greece. This is 
important to turn the tide in European public 
opinion concerning Greek citizens, who, 
unfortunately, are generally portrayed or 
stereotyped as lazy people receiving pensions 
from the age of 45 and avoiding paying tax.
• The contribution of civil society and of large 
international NGOs like Solidarity Now with 
the support of the OSF and organisations 
such as the International Rescue Committee 
and Amnesty International is crucial and 
very much needed.
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